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Proposals submitted to the Seabeds Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly 1 and by the Report of the President's Commission 
on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources 2 contain blueprints for 
the establishment of international agencies with respect to seabed 
exploitation, the duration and extent of licens.es of seabed areas, the 
quantum of the interest granted, the conditions of forfeiture and the 
destination of revenues. They do not, however, offer concrete proposals 
for combatting the pollution effects of deep sea mining and merely, at 
best, make some pious reference to the need for taking environmental 
issues and interests into account. In the following pages one concrete 
proposal will be made and supported on the basis of both the utility and 
relevance of the concept of "Impact Reports". 
II. "GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LA w" 
Although the legislation of a single state cannot validly be viewed as a 
"source",3 under Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, one may argue that domestic law developments can provide 
importan-~ analogies for developing international law. But this is a 
position which stems from the traditional positivistic dichotomy 
between lex ferenda and lex lata. Indeed, municipal legislation suffers 
in comparison with the writings of publicists and the decisions of 
domestic tribunals since these latter are specifically named as sources 
* Professor Law; Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse Univer-
sity College of Law. 
l. For a collection of the draft treaties and proposals submitted to the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction of the United Nations General Assembly see United Nations Secretariat, 
Comparative Table of Draft Treaties, Working Papers and Draft Articles, U.N. Doc. 
Al AC.138/L.10 (mimeo. January 28, 1972). 
2. See, COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND 
THE SEA 147-51 (1969) [hereinafter cited as "OuR NATION AND THE SEA"]. In addition to OuR 
NATION AND THE SEA the Commission published three volumes of PANEL REPORTS, i.e., vol. 
1, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT (1969); vol. 2, INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY: KEYS TO OCEAN 
DEVELOPMENT (1969); vol. 3, MARINE RESOURCES AND LEGAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
THEIR DEVELOPMENT (1969) [hereinafter cited as "PANEL REPORTS" and prefixed by the ap-
propriate volume number]. See also, 3 PANEL REPORTS VIII-36-38. 
3. On the meaning of the term "source of law" see, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 24-25 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955) [hereinafter cited as "OPPENHEIM"]. 
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albeit "subsidiary" sources of international law in aleana d. It is, 
furthermore, unusual to see specific acts of legislation (as distinct from 
the general provisions of codes which may be viewed as merely the 
legislative restatement of "common law" in its widest sense) providing 
the domestic law analogies contemplated in Article 38.1.c., i.e., "the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations". This 
phenomenon is to be contrasted with the hospitable reception by 
international lawyers of "common law" doctrines developed by 
domestic courts and publicists.4 While the famous Lex Aquilia 5 may 
appear to have been accorded a similar reception by international 
lawyers-for example the reception of its offshoot doctrine of lucrum 
cessans in the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow 6-its attraction 
lay, not so much in the original plebiscitum 7 of the Roman people, as in 
the general principles, interpretations, analogies and extensions which 
had come to cover it in layer after layer of sedimentation of ideas over 
more than two thousand years of doctrinal exposition, exegetics and 
glosses. 8 
The rationale of international lawyers' restraint in drawing upon 
legislative enactments (other than codifications of "common law") 
stems from statutes' specificity and limited scope. By contrast with 
legislation, those municipal law rules which are most apt to provide the 
materials of general principles of law are, when stripped of their 
national peculiarities and technical elaborations, capable of a general, if 
not a universal, synthesis. In this way legal principles which are 
common to, underpin and explain, specific domestic law doctrines, pro-
vide international lawyers with the' greater part of the materials of 
decision and of legal development under aleana c. of Article 38.1. 
As domestic legislative activity increases in both significance and 
volume as a means of both law reform and the expression of 
fundamental social values within states, so the traditional objections to 
the reception of statute law as a source of general principles of law 
should become obsolete. The fact that they have not done so testifies to 
the almost intransigent conservatism of the legal profession in matters 
of method. 
4. See, e.g., the use of equity by Judge Hudson in Diversion of the Waters from the 
River Meuse, [1937] P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B. No. 70, at 76-79 and of equitable reliance in 
connection with the "Ihlen Declaration" in the Status of Eastern Greenland Case, [1933] 
P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B No. 53 at 69-73. 
5. INSTITUTES 4.3; LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 80-137 (1950); LAFONTANTAINE, 
PASICRISIE INTERNATIONALE 364; LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 117-18 (1933). 
6. [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9 at 21. 
7. See JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 289 (1932). 
8. On the reception of the Lex Aquilia in international law see, generally, 1 WHITEMAN, 
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LA w. 
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The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 9 provides an example 
of legislation which, although enacted to meet a specific need local to 
the environment of the United States and drafted in terms of the 
technicalities of federal legislation, reflects also an increasingly 
universal solicitude for our global habitat. In this sense the Act provides 
other states with an example of how concern to develop legal machinery 
capable of effective environmental protection can be translated into 
legislation. It also offers useful and adaptable legal doctrines and 
institutions to the framers of universal and regional conventions on the 
management of pollution. 
The background of the Act includes a unique document, namely the 
Joint Senate-House Colloquium on the Environment entitled the 
Congressional White Paper and A National Policy on the 
Environment. 10 This pointed clearly to the dilemma of feeling compelled 
to choose between productivity and environmental preservation and to 
the legal means of passing between the horns of this dilemma. It set out, 
in the following terms, what were later to be the basic policies of the 
Act: 
If America is to create a carefully designed, healthful, and 
balanced environment, we must (1) find equitable ways of 
charging for environmental abuses within the traditional free-
market economy; (2) obtain adequate ecological guidance on 
the character and impact of environmental change; (3) where 
corporate resource development does not preserve 
environmental values, then consider the extension of 
governmental controls in the larger public interest; ( 4) 
coordinate the Government agency activities, which share 
with industry the dominant influence in shaping our 
environment; and (5) establish judicial procedures so that the 
individual rights to a productive and high-quality environment 
can be assured. 11 
9. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. ~~ 4321-47 0970) 83 Stat. 852, 
Pub. L. No. 91-190 (Jan. 1, 1970). See also Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 
U.S.C. ~~ 1151notes,1152, 1155, 1156, 1158, 1160-75 (1970), 84 Stat. 91 , Pub. L. No. 91-224 
(Apr. 3, 1970); Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 104 (Supp. 1970) 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (Mar. 7, 
1970). 
Guidelines implementing the National Environmental Policy Act were issued by the 
Council on Environmental Quality on AQ_ril 23, 1971. See, Guidelines for FederalAg_encies, 
under the National Environmental Policy Act, BNA ER - Federal Laws 71:0301, 36 Fed . 
Reg. 7724 (1971) [hereinafter cited as "Guidelines"]. 
10. SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS & HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE 
AND ASTRONAUTICS, 90th CONG., 2d SESS., CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL POLICY 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1968) [hereinafter cited as "CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER"]. 
11. Jd. at2. 
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III. LEGISLATIVE POLICY 
On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
became effective as law in the United States. Its enactment reflected 
both the solicitude of special altruistic interest groups anxious to 
preserve the beauties of North America and a widespread concern 
among Congressmen and in the electorate regarding the need to take 
significant and immediate steps in charging upon the country's miracle 
of increasing productivity a due accountability for the "spillovers" or 
side effects of that productivity 12 which are rapidly degrading the 
environment. 
After asserting Congress' recognition of the "profound impact" of 
modern society on "the interrelations of all components of the natural 
environment," 13 Section lOl(b) of the Act ( 42 United States Code 
Section 433Hb)) sets out the Congress' environmental policy 
directives 14 to the Federal Government as follows: 
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of 
the environment for succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and 
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the 
environment without degradation, risk to heal th or safety, or 
other undesirable and unintended consequences; 
( 4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects 
of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an 
environment which supports diversity and variety of 
individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use 
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing 
of life's amenities; and 
12. See, e.g., Mishan, The Spillover Enemy, 33 ENCOUNTER 3 (Dec. 1969) [hereinafter 
cited as "Mishan"]. See also Goldie, Amenities Rights-Parallels to Pollution Taxes, 11 
NATURAL RESOURCES J . 274 (1971) [hereinafter cited as "Goldie, A rnenities Rights 'l 
13. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ~ lOlA, 42 U.S.C. ~ 4331 (a). See also 
the statement of the purposes of the Act in ~ 2, 42 U.S.C. ~ 4321. 
14. The drafting of the Act around duties to carry out affirmative "policy di-
rectives" underscores the fine point made by Eva H. and John L. Hanks in An Environ-
mental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 
RUTGERS L. REv. 230 (1970) [hereinafter cited as "Hanks & Hanks'1 , that "[i]n form 
the National Environmental Policy Act is a statute; in spirit a constitution." Id. at 245. 
"Policy directives" are, of course, constitutional devices in the constitutions of the 
Republic of India and of the Republic of Ireland . Their effectiveness may well come to 
depend on the independence and vision of the judiciary. This dependence on the judiciar\ 
for the effectiveness of policy directives has been well demonstrated in the United States 
in such cases as Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 2 ERC 1779 <D.C. Cir. 1971 ), and Committee for 
Nuclear Responsibility V. Seaborg, 3 ERC 1126 m.c. Cir. 1971). 
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(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach 
the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. 
IV. "AMENITIES RIGHTS" AND THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
43 
In a brief preliminary statement this writer has suggested that a 
combination of common law elaboration and legislative blueprints 
(which purposely did not include the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the discussion) might be viewed as foreshadowing the possible 
crystallization of "amenities rights" in the domestic legal orders of at 
least some states of the United States. 15 One question is whether the 
National Environmental Policy Act 'has added a further consolidation in 
this process of development, and, if it has done so, whether the Act's 
contribution has been through the depositing of substantive rights out 
of procedural directives. Judge Eisele has asserted that the National 
Environmental Policy Act does not vest "substantive rights" 16 in 
individuals and organizations. It merely prescribes "procedural 
requirements." 17 Note should, however, be taken of Section lOl(c) of 
the Act ( 42 United States Code Section 4331(c)). It provides that: 
The Congress recognizes each person should enjoy a healthful 
environment and that each person has a responsibility to 
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the 
environment. 
Thus, the issue of what stake individuals have in the Act is more 
subtle than Judge Eisele's formulation would allow. For example, this 
subsection has provided the basis for some federal courts to assert that 
federal agencies have substantive duties under the Act, and especially 
under Section 102 ( 42 United States Code Section 4332). An example is 
to be found in the following unequivocal formulation by the Court of 
Appeals of the D~strict of Columbia Circuit: 
We conclude, then, that Section 102 of the NEPA mandates a 
particular sort of careful and informed decision making 
process and creates enforceable duties .18 
The phrase "enforceable duties" is clearly susceptible of an 
overzealous emphasis but it does not expressly require the recognition 
15. Goldie, Amenities Rights, supra note 12. 
16. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. 
Ark. 1971). 
17. Id. 
18. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 2 ERC 1779, 1783 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also id. 
at 1782. 
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of substantive rights to be vested in individuals. On the other hand, the 
requirements of its hard core meaning induce the expectation that 
courts will recognize individuals' "non-Hohfeldian" 19 interests in 
requiring agencies to pay all due regard to environmental amenities 
when engaged in the development and application of their policies, 
plans and programs. 
· Be that as it may, the legislative history of the Act is significant on 
this basic issue of whether Congress intended to create substantive 
rights in amenities. The record shows that, while many members of 
Congress expressed their apprehension that it would create new 
substantive rights of a dangerously disruptive and far-reaching 
character,20 its sponsors hastened to assure the fearful and the 
suspicious that they had an entirely procedural enactment before 
them.21 In the meantime, members of the public who are adversely 
affected by federal policies have, in Professor Jaffe's terms, "non-
Hohfeldian" legally protectable interests. In indicating the reference of 
this term Professor Jaffe teJls us: 
It is not possible to formulate these interests in traditional 
right-duty terms. But I would emphatically reject the 
conclusion that because there can be no rights-no 'legal 
injury' in the traditional sense-we are driven to the opposite 
pole that there is only a 'public interest.' Where the legislature 
h(Jj} recognized a certain 'interest' (J1} one which must be 
heeded, it is such a 'legally protected interest' (J1} warrants 
standing to complain of its disregard. 22 
There are four significant points to note regarding Professor Jaffe's 
presentation of his "non-Hohfeldian interests": 
(1) Both his terminology and his thesis have been adopted by the 
19. For a discussion of this term see infra, notes 20-22 and the accompanying text. 
20. Typical of such opposition was that of Congressman Harsha when he said: 
I am still concerned about the sweeping affect [sic] this legislation could have on 
the substantive law .... 
115 CONG. REC. H. 13095 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 1969). See also: Congressman Farbstein, id., at 
H. 13096; Congressman Dingell, submitting the Conference Report on S. 1075 National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and the Report itself, id. at H. 12633 and H. 12635 <Dec. 
17, 1969). 
21. See, for statements as to the policy directive and procedural qualities of the Act, 
by its main sponsors, Senator Jackson id. at S. 17451 (Dec. 20, 1969), and id. at 17453, 
17454; Senator Muskie id. at S. 17458 and S. 17460. 
22. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 508 (1965) (author's emphasis), 
see also Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideo-
wgical Plaintiff, 116 u. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968). 
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Supreme Court of the United States as far as the preliminary issue of 
standing to sue in federal courts is concerned; 23 
(2) Professor Jaffe's formulation was offered some three and a half 
years before the signing of the National Environmental Policy Act into 
law on January 1, 1970, and so he may have felt the need to be more 
tentative, at least with respect to environmental issues, than he might 
be now-especially in the light of Judge Wright's thesis in Calvert 
Cliffs' that the National Environmental Policy Act creates "enforceable 
duties" 24 which individuals and unincorporated entities can pursue; 
(3) While "amenities rights" were not crystallized by the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, even as interpreted by Judge Wright, 
the possible outline of their contours may become contingently 
discernible, should the trend of legislation and court decision continue 
to amass legal materials for elucidation and generalization in terms of 
such rights; 
(4) While interests begin their formulations in terms of non-Hohfeldian 
interests, they may ultimately come to be articulated in terms of strict 
rights and their correlative duties-even when those duties may appear 
as being owed on an objective basis in terms of social values and policy. 
Should Professor Jaffe feel impelled to reject this evolutionary 
appraisal of the evanescent quality of the "interests" he ordains, then he 
ought to own up to having mixed an over-rich cocktail of disparate 
ingredients-having taken the analytical (and even compulsive) verbal 
exactitude of Hohfeld he combined it with the "objective" social 
idealism of Duguit and with the idealistic (and Hegelian) historicism of 
Savigny. Such a mixture indicates, surely, an heroic recipe for a 
nightmare! A more soberly pragmatic evolutionary stance would 
appear to provide the easier and more credible explanation. The 
suggestion is, therefore, that Professor Jaffe's "non-Hohfeldian 
interests" can crystallize into more conventionally conceived rights and 
privileges when legislative developments (constituted, possibly, by the 
accumulation of disparate enactments all of which can be related to 
aspects of an emerging common purpose), imaginate judicial decision, 
and the classifications of publicists in combination to felt social needs in 
a specific area. While it is under these auspicious circumstances that 
substantive rights may come to be "secreted in the interstices of 
procedure" (to call Sir Henry Maine's great insight regarding the 
emergence of substantive law in involving societies) social, political and 
juridical, these conditions have not, as yet, combined to create 
23. See Justice Douglas in his opinion for the Court, Association of Data Process-
ing f:~rvices Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970). 
24. ::,ee, supra note lb. 
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presently-existing substantive rights to amenities which individuals are 
entitled to vindicate before appropriate administrative courts of law or 
tribunals. 
v. AMENITIES AND IMPACT REPORTS 
Through the National Environmental Policy Act the Congress directs 
all Federal agencies to "utilize a systematic interdisciplinary approach" 
to ensure the "integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the 
environmental design arts" 25 in their decisionmaking processes, and to 
develop methods and procedures so as to ensure that "presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values" will be given 
"appropriate consideration" 26 in their recommending, licensing and 
other regulatory deliberations. These "presently unquantified 
environmental values" are thus to take their place alongside "economic 
and technical considerations" 27 as determinative factors for 
administrators to consider. 
In order to ensure that the "presently unquantified environmental 
values and amenities" will be given their "appropriate consideration" 
the Act enjoins upon the agency or agencies taking action to have the 
"responsible official" prepare a detailed statement (severally known as 
the "environmental report", the "environmental statement", or the 
"impact report") containing detailed appraisals of: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man 's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
resources which would be involved in the proposed action 
should it be implemented.28 
The foregoing summary of selected provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act poses at least three matter':l for further 
development. These are: (A) the significance of the term "appropriate 
consideration" in Section 102 (2)(B) ( 42 United States Code Section 4332 
(2)(B)); (B) the problem of the outer limits of relevance-both for th e 
environmental reports and for decisionmaking; and (C) the standards to 
be applied in determining the protection of the "amenities". 
25. * 102(2)(A), 42 U.S .C. * 4332(2)( A) . 
26. * 102(2)<B), 42 U.S.C. * 4332<2)<B). 
27. Id. 
28. * 102(2)(C), 42 U .S.C. * 4332(2)<C). 
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A. "Appropriate Consideration" 
The first question is whether "appropriate consideration" permits an 
agency leeway in considering the relevance of environmental policy 
issues. In Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC 29 Judge Wright, for the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir<'nit stated: 
The word 'appropriate' in § 102(2)(B) cannot be interpreted to 
blunt the thrust of the whole Act or to give agencies broad 
discretion to downplay environmental factors in their decision 
making processes. The Act requires consideration 
'appropriate' to the problem of protecting our threatened 
environment, not consideration 'appropriate' to the whims, 
habits or other particular concerns of federal agencies. 30 
The duties prescribed in Section 102 ( 42 United States Code Section 
4332) are not inherently flexible. They must be complied with to the 
fullest extent-unless they are confronted by a clearly and directly 
contradictory statutory authority in other legislation. Thus Section 104 
(42 United States Code Section 4334) provides that the environmental 
legislation does not eliminate any duties already imposed by other 
"specific statutory obligations". Only when such specific obligations 
collide with national environmental policy requirements do the agencies 
have any rationale for diluting their obligation to comply with the 
"letter and spirit" of the statute. 31 This is supported by the House 
conferees who reported that Section 105 (42 United States Code Section 
4335) "does not obviate the requirement that the Federal agencies 
conduct their activities in accordance with the provisions of this bill 
unless to do so would clearly violate their existing statutory 
obligations". 32 
Secondly, we may ask when does an agency have to be seized of an 
environmental issue in its process of decision. Judge Wright in Calvert 
Cliffs' tells us that an agency may "not simply sit back, like an 
umpire",33 and resolve adversary contentions regarding environmental 
issues. "Rather, it must itself take the initiative of considering 
environmental values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of 
the process .... " 34 Thus, in the case under discussion, Judge Wright 
characterized the Atomic Energy Commission's willingness to consider 
environmental issues within the hearing process only when they might 
29. 2 ERC 1779 m.c. Cir. 1971). 
30. Id. at 1781n . 16. 
31. Id. at 1782 n. 21. 
32. Conference Repo:-t on S. 1075, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 115, pt. 29 at 39, 703 (1969). 
33. 2 ERC 177!:) , 1785 m.c. Cir. 1971). 
34. Id. 
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be raised by one of the parties, and not otherwise, as a .. crabbed 
interpretation" 35 of the National Environmental Policy Act. Federal 
agencies have an affirmative duty of developing the environmental 
aspects of the record before them on their own initiatives, and of 
rendering their decisions in terms of all the factors (including the 
environmental ones) contained in such records. 
Third, federal agencies may not resign their affirmative tasks by 
accepting the standards set by the states or by other federal agencies. 
They are required to apply the National Environmental Pol icy Act in all 
cases which fall short of the statutory confrontation Section 104 ( 42 
United States Code Section 4334) envisages. As to water quality 
standards in particular, Section 104 (42 United States Code Section 
4334) does bring into play consideration of the Water Quality 
Improvement Act of 1970.36 This does not, however, call for abdication; 
for other "specific statutory obligations" are not to replace the National 
Environmental Policy Act entirely. It ensures, rather, that the Act will 
not negate the following obligations: (a) that of complying with 
standards set under the Water Quality Improvement Act and of not 
nullifying those standards; (b) that of coordinating with or consulting 
agencies charged with the maintenance and improvement of water 
quality standards; and (c) that of acting, or refraining from acting 
"contingent upon" a certification under the Water Quality 
Improvement Act. (This Act makes an agency's granting of a license 
"contingent upon a water quality certification." But "it does not 
require" the agency "to grant a license once a certification has been 
issued." 37 ) The agency should thus act upon an environmental report 
which assesses adverse environmental effects of any proposed action 
and discusses possible alternatives to the proposed action.38 
Fourth, in conclusion, Calvert Cliffs' tells us that a federal agency is 
under an obligation to inform itself through impact reports of 
environmental problems of any contemplated action, and then take 
independent action, if necessary, to make its decision in the light of such 
reports as part of the record before it and upon which its decision is 
based. 
35. Id. at 17~4. 
36. 84 Stat. 91, Public Law 91-224. 33 U.S.C. * * 1151. 1152. 1156, 1158, 1160-'15 ( 1970). 
37. Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC, 2 ERC 1779, 1789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Judge Wright's 
emphasis). 
38. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 ERC 1126, 1128 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as ''A mchitka'1. 
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B. "Detail,ed Statement "-An Obligation of Jt'ull Disclosure 
In Emrironmental Defen.c;e Fund Inc. v. Corps of Engineers 39 
Judge Parker indicated the duty of the Federal Government to work on 
the basis of a detailed and systematic impact statement in the following 
terms: 
The rNational Environmental Policv Actl recognizes a 
'continuing responsibility of the Federal Government' to 
strive to preserve and enhance the environment, and requires a 
detailed and systematic consideration of the environmental 
impact of Federal actions. 40 
The Act's call for a detailed statement has been viewed as setting a 
standard with which agencies must comply and on the basis of which 
courts will review the degree of detail of any environmental statement. 
Secondly, the courts do not hold the provision as merely calling for a 
statement oriented from the project's point of view, but as demanding 
an environmental investigation conducted in terms of objective and 
thorough research. Thus in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin 41 
Judge Gasch outlined the policy of the rel event provision. He said: 
This section makes the completion of an adequate research 
program a prerequisite to agency action. The adequacy of the 
research should be judged in light of the scope of the proposed 
program and the extent to which existing knowledge raises the 
possibility of potential adveq;e environmental effects. The Act 
envisions that program formulation will be directed by 
research results rather than that research programs will be 
designed to substantiate programs already decided upon. 
Thus, this provision of the Act requires a diligent research 
effort, undertaken in good faith, which utilizes effective 
methods and reflects the current state of the art of relevant 
scientific discipline. 42 
And he specifically defined the statutory criterion of "detailed 
statement" as follows: 
The statement must be sufficiently detailed to allow a 
responsible executive to arrive at a reasonably accurate 
decision regarding the environmental benefits and detriments 
to be expected from program implementation. The statement 
should contain adequate discussion of alternative proposals to 
allow for program modification during agency review so that 
39. 324 F. Supp. 878 <D.D.C. 1971). 
40. Id. at 886. 
41. 325 F. Supp. 1401<D.D.C.1971). 
42. Id. 1403. 
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the results to be achieved will be in accordance with national 
environmental goals. 43 
In a similar vein Judge Eisele, in Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. 
Corps of Engineers, 44 gave the Act the very interesting characterization 
of an "environmental full disclosure law" 45 and added, speaking of 
Section 102's requirements: 
The Congress, by enacting it, may not have intended to alter 
the then existing decision-making responsibilities or to take 
away any then existing freedom of decision-making, but it 
certainly intended to make such decision-making more re-
sponsive and more responsible. 
The 'detailed statement' required by Section 102(2) (C) 
should, at minimum, contain such information as will alert the 
President, the Council on Environmental Quality, the public, 
and, indeed, the Congress to all known possible environmental 
consequences of proposed agency action. Where experts, or 
concerned public or private organizations, or even ordinary lay 
citizens, bring to the attention of the responsible agency 
environmental impacts which they contend will result from 
the proposed agency action, then the Section 102 statement 
should set forth these contentions and opinions, even if the 
responsible agency finds no merit in them whatsoever. Of 
course, the Section 102 statement can and should also contain 
the opinion of the responsible agency with respect to all such 
viewpoints. The record should be complete. Then, if the 
decisionmakers choose to ignore such factors they will be doing 
so with their eyes wide open.46 
C. The Outer Limits of Relevance 
We are being taught inexorably and perhaps with brutal inevitability 
how the environment is a seamless web and how our burgeoning gross 
national product continuously sets in process chain reactions which 
appear to be without end. On the other hand, the law, to make decisions 
manageable, must cut the causal chain; otherwise the search for the 
complete content of an agency's environmental statement could be an 
unceasing quest. While the Act does not set forth the limits of its 
intended scope; they must be read into it by a reasonable construc-
tion. Although no formal or abstract limitation can be set to the 
number of links of causation, nor ought the imposition of such mis-
leading criteria as "direct and indirect" be attempted, relevance, as 
a test which combined the degree of knowledge with the forseeability of 
specific environmental degradation should not be beyond the ingenuity 
of the draftsmen to formulate or judges to apply. 
43. Id. at 1403-04. 
44. 325 F. Supp. 749 <E .D. Ark. W. Div. 1971). 
45. Id. at 759 . 
46. Id. 
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"Relevance" in this context could be illustrated by distinguishing a 
Federal Housing Authority considering the granting of loans for houses 
in a development whose area had been cleared through the chopping 
down of a uniquely valuable forest from that Authority undertaking to 
review whether it should continue to support financially the current 
American demand for single-home ownership, since such a method of 
providing shelter calls for construction methods which create an 
inevitable demand for vast amounts of lumber. That is, should it 
support social values which lead to large-scale deforestation when 
alternative methods of providing comfortable hygienic and 
aesthetically pleasing housing which use far less lumber could be 
availed of? Whereas the former would necessarily fall within the scope 
of an environmental report, the latter would clearly involve issues 
beyond the assumptions underlying FHA's functions, and beyond the 
scope of its environmental investigations under the Act. 
In the process of agency decision-making other relevant factors in 
addition to environmental ones, namely scientific, engineering, social 
need and economic advantage, are all brought to bear. While each set of 
factors calls for its own application in terms of the agency's overall 
goals, it cannot impose a monolithic guide to decision. Impact or 
environmental reports follow a similar pattern of appraisal, 
modification and partial displacement as do the other factors to be 
taken into consideration on the record. This acknowledgment, however, 
does not negate the crucial role such reports play in the flow of 
administrative decisions which the law now requires to be guided 
towards the betterment of society and its total environment. 
D. The Standards 
The Guideline:-; 47 which the Council on Environmental Quality 
promulgated on April 23, 1971, set the affected agencies the concrete 
task of individually providing specific standards to govern the conduct 
which fell within the scope of authority each enjoyed. My proposal here 
is merely to indicate some of the underpinning values to those 
standards. 
Capitalist and socialist societies alike assume that human welfare 
advances by transforming the raw materials of the universe into the 
means of production and consumer goods. Generally speaking, neither 
type of society has come to accept the harsh facts of life that this 
process of converting "nature" into "goods" has its own spillover costs, 
indeed its own dangers to human welfare. That this could be the case is 
the perception of only a small minority in the most advanced societies. 
Amongst the vast majority of humanity such a position is still greeted 
47. See, supra note 9. 
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with skepticism, or even as the enunciation of a cruel joke. Peoples who 
do not enjoy the cornucopia of a high gross national product and its 
concomitant of a high level of spillover pollutions tend to view the 
concern of industrialized societies for environmental matters as a 
hypocritical sophistry for preventing the full economic development of 
the underdeveloped areas of the world or, in the industrial states, as a 
confidence trick to undermine our traditional trust in technological 
virtuosity and managerial competence. Despite the lag in public 
opinion, however, the development of safeguards against harmful side 
effects resulting from the transformation of "nature" into "property", 
and the formulation from the modalities of liability for the harms those 
transformations bring in their train, are becoming urgent tasks for 
lawyers. It is thus becoming increasingly urgent to define independent 
environment base values which can be built into the contemporary 
exploitative consumer values of free enterprise and socialist societies 
alike. One such value is to ensure that the amenities of the community 
are not threatened, even though they may be transformed while 
consumer goods raise living standards. 
VI. THE DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNINGS OF 
IMPACT REPORTS 
Legal doctrines (for example the doctrines of part performance, 
undue influence and estoppel) are bodies of principles and rules 
collected together and arranged in terms of a defining legal concept and 
reflect a basic social value - for example, respectively, mutuality, 
dependence and the reliances of the weaker or more vulnerable parties. 
By virtue of their complexity and comprehensiveness, legal doctrines, 
while distinguished from legal rules, standards, principles and 
concepts, are shaped out of them. In structuring the relations of their 
component rules, principles and standards the concepts they crystallize 
articulate social claims for justice. The deeply felt social values to which 
they give expression have a double function: First, that of clarification 
and an increasingly specific formulation out of the welter of sentiments 
and ideas (both articulate and inarticulate) at large in the society of the 
time and place of their emergence; and, Second the reception of those 
ideals of justice into the formal legal order. This process of the 
crystallization of rules and principles around a definitive idea (the 
concept) identifies the doctrine's provenance as a claim of justice at 
large in society which emerges into the law when it becomes capable of 
expression in specific and technical legal terms. The emergence and 
reception of a general notion of justice emerging into the practical 
formulations of the law is thus also a process of both clarification and 
implementation. In addition, the time must be ripe for the reception 
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into the legal order of those emerging ideas. Reception is a dispository 
act by designated personnel, for example judges, and so is to be 
distinguished from clarification and emergence. These are part of the 
processes of society at large. 
Thus legal doctrines come into being through the following process: A 
developing and relatively specific articulation of the notion of justice 
comes to involve claims that create a demand for its legal 
implementation; new rules and doctrines are then forged, or old ones 
gathered together around that notion - thereby creating the modalities 
of the idea's reception into law; those rules and doctrines themselves. 
become grouped around the idea as it clarifies in the law's process of 
claim, counterclaim and accommodation. The idea of justice then 
emerges both as the defining concept governing those principles and 
rules forming the doctrine and the determinant of the mode of 
their interrelated grouping, as it were in a constellation, around it. 
The central and defining idea or legal concept groups and arranges the 
rules and principles. This illustrates how reception is also a part 
of the clarification process of society just as judges are part of society. 
Legal doctrines have, in the main, been developed by courts in a 
process of applying a given basic value through rules and principles 
chosen for the task, of testing and reviewing results, and of 
reformulation of the defining concept. Legislatures have, if onl:v 
infrequently, been the sources of legal doctrines - for example in the 
area of "no fault" automobile insurance and Workmen's Compensation 
laws. But there is no reason why a carefully drawn statute should not 
equally fulfill the legal and societal conditions of constituting a legal 
doctrine as does a judicially created legal doctrine. Indeed, the 
conservative suspicion lawyers entertain of legislation as a source of 
law, and their professional resistance to examining the policy aspects of 
a statute in the same spirit as theJ' do case law's, may help to explain 
why, in the present age of widespread legislative reform, so few legal 
doctrines with a legislative provenance have been recognized as 
appropriate sources of international law. Be that as it may, Section 102 
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 satisfies the criteria 
for a legal doctrine. It is the reception and legal expression of a deeplJ' 
held value at large in modern society; around the central legal concept 
of full disclosure there is a cluster of rules and standards; subordinate 
to the Act and in order to implement it the Executive has promulgated 
guidelines for making the requisite full disclosures. 
The doctrinal roots of the legal principles and rules clustered around 
Impact Reports are, therefore: (1) the social demand for environmental 
protection which is reflected in the building of environmental costs into 
the process of manufacture and use of impact reports to ensure that 
society will not be called upon to bear an undertaking's environmental 
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costs; (2) the defining of the obligations the statute imposes on an 
enterprise to make full disclosures of possible environmental 
degradations attendant on the establishment of a proposed undertaking 
or installation; and (3) the duties of administrators to take impact 
reports fully into account when licensing a projected undertaking. 
These are the defining concepts around which the specific rules set out 
in t he legislation and guidelines are arranged, not in the black and 
white formulation of the Section, but in its operation in the process of 
decision. Impact Reports may thus be seen as the institutional 
representation of the basic legal concept of the legal doctrine contained 
in Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
namely the doctrine requiring economic enterprises to minimize their 
environment degradations, to carry t he costs of their environmental 
alternations and to make a full disclosure of their impact on the 
environment. This doctrine (and its institutional expression - the 
Impact Report) is capable of universal application through legislation in 
domestic systems and internationally through agreements and through 
t he settlement of disputes by arbitration or conciliation. 
VII. ADAPTABILITY OF IMPACT REPORTS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL RECEPTION: AN APPRAISAL 
A. The Concept of "Impact Reports" 
While it is true that when an agency acts upon a record it must take 
into account matters other than the environmental factors; yet part of 
the record dealing with the environment must be given full 
consideration. The environmental factors are not merely to be found in 
the record as fortuitously and as the result of the assiduity of private 
groups, or of contending parties at a hearing, but must be placed there 
by the agency itself. This is done by the preparation of the report by the 
agency which then focuses attention on the environmental factors 
relevant to the decision-makers' decisions. For example, in A mchitka 48 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia tells us: 
Moreover, the statement has significance in focusing 
environmental factors for informed appraisal by the 
President, who has broad concern even when not directly 
involved in the decisional process, and in any event by 
Congress and the public.49 
As a device which should provide an important input in the appraisal 
48. Supra note 38. 
49. Supra note 36, at 1128. 
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of a proposal, a plan or an application, an environment report has a 
number of facets. These include: 
(1) Its informational and fact-collating function by the agency; 
(2) Its evidential value of the thoroughness of the agency's 
good faith environmental investigations; 
(3) Its role in ensuring that environmental factors, as 
embodied in an essential part of the record, are duly 
considered by the agency in reaching its conclusion; 
( 4) Its utility for purposes of review and reconsideration at all 
levels, including, in appropriate circumstances, review by the 
President or the Congress; 
(5) Its significance in giving standing before the Federal 
courts to individuals and private groups who wish to bring 
agency decisions before the courts for judicial review on the 
basis of claims that either constitutional (and especially "due 
process") or statutory (for example "environmental policy", 
"water quality", or "pure air") "interests" 50 have not been 
adequately considered by the relevant agency (or agencies); 
and 
(6) Its evolving importance in crystallizing the notion of 
"interests" procedurally sufficient to give parties "standing" 
before tbe courts into substantive rights to life in terms of the 
amenities which make such a right viable, meaningful and 
practical. 
B. Adapting Impact Reports to an International Regime Governing 
Deep-Sea Mining Activities 
(1) Environmental Problems of Deep-Sea Mining 
The International Declaration on Human Rights, Article 3, proclaims 
a "right to life" to all individual human beings. 51 This right may develop 
ancilliary claims for environmental protection and even enhancement. 
For a right to life is meaningless if it guarantees a meagre existence 
assuring no more than a brutish survival. Accordingly, claims for the 
protection, and even the enhancement, of amenities may be viewed as 
emerging as matters of international concern in specific areas of 
international action. Among these, necessarily, is deep-sea mining with 
its possibilities of major pollution damage to the world's oceans. Deep-
sea mining can be classified into a number of subdivisions. Those of-
fered here are: (a) winning fossil fuels under the seabed; and (b) 
capturing surficial deposits, especially nodules from the seabed of the 
deep oceans. The winning of minerals in suspension in seawater will 
50. For the connotation and significance of Professor Jaffe's development of the term 
"interests" in the context of "standing" see, supra note 22 and its accompanying text. 
51. 3. U.N.GAOR 1, 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). See also International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, art. 6. 1, Annex to G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 61 AM. J. INT'L. L. 
861, 863 (1967). 
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barely be touched on here, since for the time being at any rate it will 
offer little to a discussion of the relevance of impact reports to 
international mining regimes. 
(a) Winning Fossil Fuels Under the Seabed 
For a considerable time oil has been taken from shallow seabed areas. 
But recent improvements in technology have allowed economically 
feasible oil drilling to take place beyond the 200 meter bathymetric 
contour line.52 (The outer limit of the legal continental shelf as defined 
in terms of an isobath.) 53 This technological trend 54 will become 
intensified as demand increases.55 Thus, Our Nation and the Sea tells 
us: 
Twenty-two countries now produce or are about to produce oil 
and gas from offshore sources. In vestments of the domestic 
offshore oil industry, now running more than $1 billion 
annually, are expected to grow an average of nearly 18 per cent 
per year over the coming decade. Current free world offshore 
oil production is about 5 million barrels per day, or about 16 
per cent of the free world's total output.56 
As claims to develop more offshore oil and gas resources go into deeper 
and deeper regions, they will inevitably give rise to more acute 
problems of polluting the seas and the coasts. 
52. See, Goldie. The Expwitability Test - Interpretation and Potentialities, 8 NATURAL 
RESOURCES J. 434-36 (1968), especially notes 1and2, the accompanying text and Appendix I 
for an outline of this trend off the coasts of the United States. 
53. See, Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964). 
54. Experimental drillings have already been conducted through over 11,000 feP.t of 
water into the sediment beneath. See e.g., the report of the Glomar Challenger's drilling 
through 11,720 feet of water and a further 472 feet of sediment in the Gulf of Mexico to 
discover oil in submarine salt domes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1968, at 44, cols. 2-5. This 
report indicated that the depth of 17,567 feet was also drilled. See also id., Sept. 1, 1968, at 
45, cols. 3-7, and November 26, 1968, at 28, cols. 2-7. For a report of discoveries by the U.S. 
Navy ship Kane of clues to "oil rich salt domes" in the deep ocean off the west coast of 
Africa see N.Y. Times, May 13, 1969, at 29, cols . 1-5. For reports on oil exploration plays 
on the continental shelf and slopes of the United States and Canadian Atlantic coasts, see 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1968, at 25, cols. 6-7. This article reported that: (1) permits have been 
issued for the exploration of 260 million acres or nearly 410,000 square miles of seabed; (2) 
the Shell Oil Company will use a semi-submersible rig, the Sedco H, which will drill as 
deep as 25,000 feet while sitting on the seabed under 1,000 feet of water, or afloat through 
800 feet of water: (3) most of the areas now being explored are within 200 miles of the 
largest cities of the United States (other areas are close to major Canadian cities); and 
that ( 4) most of this area is extremely turbulent like the North Sea and in contrast with 
the Gulf and Southern California coasts. Taken together, these factors greatly increase 
the dangers of major oil catastrophes near great population centers. 
55. See, OuR NATION AND THE SEA, supra note 2, at 122-30, for a projection in both de-
mand for and production of offshore oil "twenty years from now" (i.e., 1969). 
56. Id. at 122. 
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The New York Times reports between January 31 and April 3, 1969, 
of the events which constituted the sorry history of the oil drilling 
catastrophe in the Santa Barbara Channel, should indicate to 
thoughtful people the pressing need to take immediate measures for the 
protection of our environment against the time when powerful 
enterprises will be massively engaging in widespread deep-ocean 
submarine oil drilling exploitations. As exploration and exploitation 
activities extend further into the deep oceans, so must the risk of blow-
outs increase - with the consequent difficulty of getting them under 
control if rigorous conditions and regulations are not imposed. 
In addition, the requirement of absolute liability 57 has a necessary 
place here, just as it has with regard to the obligation of the operators of 
giant tankers and the sub-ocean trains and pipelines. With the 
possibility of blow-out wells in the deep oceans and damaged or 
deteriorated pipelines discharging their polluting contents into the 
ocean environment, absolute liability should be imposed for harms 
done. These possibilities also point to the risk of great harms to the 
environment and to those who look to the sea for their survival, 
livelihood, health, therapy and recreation. Furthermore, as new uses of 
the sea develop (e.g., undersea hospitals, laboratories, recreation 
centers and store houses), so will the exposure to harm increase. 
More injurious to the environment than dramatic blowouts such as 
that of Santa Barbara, and more recently that in the Gulf of Mexico, or 
even massive oil spills from giant tankers (e.g., Torrey Canyon), are the 
day-to-day minor spills and leaks of oil from a multitude of activi-
ties. The Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources 
has said: 
... [T]he most pervasive pollution comes not from headlined 
oil spills but from the many activities that take place every day 
underwater. There are about 16,000 oil wells off the 
continental United States, and the number is increasing by 
more than one thousand a year. There is rightful concern that 
oil well blowouts, leaks in pipelines, and storm damage can 
cause pollution that could ruin large parts of commercial 
fisheries, s portsfishing, and recreational areas. 58 
(b) Surficial Deposits 
Writing some five years ago, Dr. John Mero could claim: 
... [S]ubstantial engineering data and calculations show that 
57. See Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of Interna-
tional Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1189, 1215-20, 1241-44, 1246-49 (H65), and Goldie, 
International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 CoLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 309-
12 (1970), for a revival of the term "absolute liability" with a new content and operation. 
58. 1 PANEL REPORTS (III) 52-53. 
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it would be profitable to mine from the sea materials such as 
phosphates , nickel, copper, cobalt and even manganese at 
today's (1964) costs and prices. And I firmly believe that within 
the next generation, the sea will be a major source of, not only 
those metals, but of molybdenum, vanadium, lead, zinc, 
titanium, aluminum, zirconium and several other metals as 
well. 
... But most important, the sea-floor nodules should prove to 
be less expensive sources of manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper 
and possibly other metals than are our present land 
resources. 59 
While these minerals may be won increasingly from the sea, they 
undergo a cycle of constant renewal 60 which, for the foreseeable future, 
will continue to add a greater quantity of nodules to the store already on 
the seabed than could be taken for human use. This possible future 
source of wealth and well-being however, like the winning of oil and gas 
from the subsoil of the deep oceans, carry risks of polluting the 
environment. The Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering and 
Resources explains: 
Mining operations conducted completely independent of land 
(as in the deep sea or remote shallow banks) will result in 
entirely different processing and transportation problems. Ore 
will be loaded directly in barges, tankers, or ore transports. 
Immediate initial beneficiation or processing may be necessary 
at sea to reduce weight or bulk although this may require large 
processing equipment on the dredging ship. If all operations 
are conducted from a single vessel, this will further reduce the 
amount of ore collected in each trip. If multiple vessel 
operations are anticipated, one collecting and processing vessel 
could operate continuously while transport vessels shuttle to 
port. 61 
What this does not tell us is that the waste products, including acids 
and other processing chemicals, will be dumped into the sea by the 
mobile processing ship. 62 A number of such ships could turn sea areas 
59. MERO, MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 275, 280 (Amsterdam 191)5). See also Mero 
Review of Mineral Values on and under the Ocean Floor, in EXPLOITING THE OCEAN 
61 (Transactions of the Second Annual Marine Technology Society Conference and Ex-
hibit, Washington, June 27-29, 1966) [hereinafter cited as "Mero, Mineral Values'1 ; 1 
PANEL REPORTS (I) 32; 3 PANEL REPORTS (VII) 106-07; and TROEBST, CONQUEST OF THE SEA 
180-93 (1962) . 
60. See, e.g., Mero, Mineral Values at 76. 
61. See 2 PANEL REPORTS at (VI) 186; see also id. at (V) 184-85. 
62. But see 2 PANEL REPORTS at (VI) 188 where the following recommendation was 
made:. 
Research on the problem of waste disposal . .. . [U]nwise dumping of the 
tailings, if not carefull~· planned, could quickly foul a mining operation . 
Furthermore, the compatability of a marine mining operation with exploitation 
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(perhaps of no great extent initially) into maritime equivalents of slag 
heaps, causing considerable ecological change and deleteriously 
affecting the food web. Should spillover and waste disposal problems 
emerge from the winning of minerals in suspension in seawater, they 
would appear to promise to resemble greatly those connected with the 
beneficiation or processing at sea of hard minerals dredged from the 
seabed. 
(2) Some Specific Problems of Adaptation-Unique Issues for a Deep-
Sea Mining Regime 
Apart from a few facts about possible geological structures (including 
those containing oil) and the existence of nodules, we know next to 
nothing of the deep ocean bed and the continental slopes and margins. 
The creation of an international law duty to prepare the type of 
environmental reports which the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 calls for within the domestic United States would give a strong 
impulsion to the improvement of that knowledge. Secondly, if a state or 
an international agency were called upon to take such a report into 
consideration when deciding whether or not to grant an exploration or 
exploitation mining lease or license, there would be an available record 
testifying to the weight the responsibl2 decision-maker accorded to 
essential environmental factors. Should these be neglected or 
undervalued, such a failure would be apparent on review or in the event 
of subsequent claims being made by injured persons. Thirdly, in the 
event of a decision to grant the application, the statement could guide 
the state or agency as to the conditions it should impose in 
consideration for granting a license, and point to the safe prospecting 
and mining methods and procedures it ought to impose in order to 
diminish the possibility of either slow leaks of polluting material or 
dramatic catastrophes. Fourthly, an impact report should be able to 
provide all interested parties (the international administering agency, 
states, consortia, international public enterprises, private and public 
enterprises, and individuals) useful guidance in pinpointing 
responsibility in the event, post hoc, of pollution occurring, or becoming 
detected. Fifthly, even at the international level, an impact report could 
operate to inform the interested and effective constituencies within 
each state as to the responsibility, or irresponsibility, of its government 
and the enterprises its government licenses or espouses towards the 
global environment. These reports would thus not only provide 
instruments whereby the regime could forestall or control polluting 
of the other resources of the sea, particularly the food resources, will depend 
principally on the effectiveness of the tailings-disposal system. 
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activities beyond the limits of state jurisdiction, but also quickly 
provide guidance for the fixing of accountability for polluting harms. 
C. The General Adaptability of Impact Reports to International 
Regional and Universal Regimes 
(1) The Universality of Impact Reports 
Impact Reports are not specifically and idiosyncratically relevant 
only to federal legal order in the United States. They are the 
institutionalization of legal doctrines capable of universal adaptation. 
Within that nation state legislatures could introduce them into their 
own administrative practices. Internationally they could be included in 
arrangements for the supranational or even the international control of 
pollution. The rules, institutions and concepts which are included 
within the doctrine (which requires enterprises to shoulder the costs of 
the changes which they make to the environment and to make full 
disclosure) have an important function applicable in all economies 
which are guided by policies of attaining (or of increasing) high levels of 
productivity. All of these are, inevitably, exposed to the "spillover 
effects" attendant upon working towards such goals. Confronted by the 
dialectic of values calling for high productivity at minimal cost and 
those insisting on environmental integrity, decisionmakers cannot 
avoid hard choices and adjustments. These choices and adjustments can 
be better informed and buttressed when environmental statements or 
reports are adapted to other legal systems, and especially to the 
proposed international regime to govern deep sea mining activities. 
(2) Needed, A "Devil's Advocate" 
Because of the great influence of both public and private enterprises 
which are likely to engage successfully in deep-sea mining activities, 
and because of the increase in costs which a scrupulous observance of 
environmental protection would incur, it may not be enough merely to 
engraft impact reports onto a deep-sea mining regime. They should be 
submitted to a specially designated and highly qualified official who 
should be given the task of "Devil's Advocate" (naturally under a more 
bureaucratically appealing title). He should closely and publicly 
question all applications to ensure that possible environmental hazards 
are eliminated. He should be guided by a deeply felt sense of obligation 
towards the preservation of this planet as a health environment for 
future generations. He should also have a clear grasp of man's ever-
increasing need to convert the planet's raw materials into commodities. 
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